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Abstract 
This paper develops a model of the housing market incorporating a construction 
sector, a rental sector, and a housing demand sector to examine the long term consequences 
for the housing market of different types of capital gains taxes. The sector is based on an 
overlapping generations model of the economy that included a detailed representation of the 
credit constraints and tax regulations affecting households. The model suggests that capital 
gains taxes will raise rents, increase homeownership rates, rebalance the housing stock 
towards smaller houses, and increase the net foreign asset position. The implications for 
welfare are much less clear, however, particularly for young low income households that will 
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      Money debases; 
     the Crown claims the widow's mite, 
                              and poor people rent. 
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1  Introduction 
This paper develops a model that analyses the long term effects of capital 
gains taxes on New Zealand’s residential property markets. The model is an 
extension of the model developed by Coleman (2008) that analysed how New 
Zealand’s tax system might be distorting the housing market when the inflation rate 
is positive but relatively modest. That paper argued that even two to three percent 
inflation rates may significantly lower homeownership rates, partly because young 
households face binding credit constraints whose effects intensify as the inflation rate 
increases, but also because interest income but not capital gains are taxed. The paper 
further argued that most of the effects on the housing market stemming from the 
interaction of inflation with the tax system could be avoided by exempting the 
inflation component of interest income from tax, or by reducing the inflation rate to 
zero. However, a third option exists: introducing a tax on capital gains may reduce 
the distortionary effects of the current tax system. To assess this possibility, this 
paper investigates how various capital gains tax regimes affect housing markets when 
there is inflation.   
The model is a version of the overlapping generations lifecycle model 
pioneered by Modigliani and Brumberg (1980), and adapted to analyse housing issues 
by Ortalo-Magné and Rady (1998, 2006). At the heart of the model is a dynamic, 
forward looking maximization problem in which agents make choices about the type 
of housing in which they live, how much they consume and save, and how much 
they borrow and lend. These agents, who differ by income, age, and wealth, have 
choices over whether to rent or buy, to live in large or small houses, or to share 
housing with other people. They face realistic bank imposed constraints on the 
amount they can borrow and the repayment schedule they face if they a purchase a 
house, and they face a tax system that closely reflects that prevailing in New Zealand. 
Particular attention is paid to the various ways that taxes on housing income differ 
according to whether one is an owner-occupier of housing or a landlord. House 
prices and rents are determined endogenously in the model, and reflect the 
interaction of decisions by households, landlords, and a construction sector to supply 
or demand housing. The model calculates dynamic steady-state paths for house 
prices and rents, and a set of equilibrium housing supply and demand patterns that 
depend on fundamental parameters such as interest rates, construction sector supply 2 
elasticities, the inflation rate, and the particulars of the tax system. The paper 
examines how these prices and demand patterns change as taxes and the inflation 
rate change, and uses these results to evaluate the consequences of different possible 
tax systems. 
 The paper examines the effects of four variants of a capital gains tax 
regime. While all four are accruals based, they differ according to whether owner-
occupied housing is taxed or exempt, and whether capital gains are treated as income 
and taxed at households’ marginal income tax rates, or whether capital gains are 
simply taxed at a flat rate. Many of the results of the four variants are similar, 
although there are important differences, particularly in the amount of revenue that is 
raised by the tax. In general, when the inflation rate is moderate, capital gains taxes 
lead to an increase in rents, an increase in the home-ownership rate, a small reduction 
in number of large houses in the economy, and an increase in the net foreign asset 
position. However, the effects on economic welfare are ambiguous, for many low-
income households suffer a welfare loss from the increase in rents. The simulations 
suggests the welfare consequences will be worse for low income households if 
owner-occupied housing is exempt from the tax, although this result is dependent on 
the revenue from a capital gains tax being refunded to households (including low 
income households) through a reduction in the GST rate.  
The primary purpose of the paper is to explore the possible economic 
consequences of different types of taxes, not to make a recommendation as to their 
desirability or practicality. Nonetheless, the paper notes that the welfare 
consequences of a capital gains tax applied to all households are similar to the welfare 
consequences of a flat rate property tax. Similarly, the welfare consequences of a 
capital gains tax that exempts owner-occupied housing are similar to the welfare 
consequences of a tax system that exempts the inflation component of interest 
income from income tax. Both of these alternative tax regimes may be easier to 
implement than a capital gains tax. Consequently, it may be possible to devise 
alternative tax regimes that have similar effects to a capital gains tax without some of 
their perceived adverse consequences.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the structure of the 
model. (The technical details of the model are contained in a lengthy appendix.) 
Section 3 discusses the results of the simulations, beginning with an exploration of 3 
the welfare consequences of the effects of inflation on the housing market, and 
concluding with a discussion of the welfare consequences of different capital gains 
tax systems. Conclusions are offered in section 4.  
2  An intergenerational model of housing demand 
2.1  The basic framework  
The model is an extension of the model used by Coleman (2008) to 
analyse the effect of inflation, credit constraints and New Zealand’s tax system on 
the housing market. In turn, it is based on the overlapping generations housing 
model of Ortalo-Magné and Rady (1998, 2006). The details of the model are 
described in the appendix, but the basic structure of the model has four key parts: 
the demand for rental and owner-occupied housing; the supply of rental housing; and 
the total supply of housing.   
The demand for housing is based on an intertemporal utility maximisation 
model of consumer demand applied to a large number of agents who differ by age, 
income, and wealth. In the model, there are four cohorts each containing 400 agents, 
with each agent passing through four distinct stages (two young stages, one middle-
aged stage, and one stage in retirement) before dying. The agents have different 
exogenously determined labour income, which follows a life-cycle pattern. The 
agents consume a single non-storable good, pay tax, save for retirement, and have 
choices over different types of housing at each stage of their lives – whether they 
share housing with other agents, rent a small house (an apartment), buy a small house 
or buy a large house. The agents choose their most preferred housing options, given 
their age, wealth and after-tax incomes, the cost of renting or buying different 
houses, and their ability to raise a mortgage. Agents can borrow or lend at 
exogenously determined interest rates, although young agents face bank imposed 
credit constraints limiting the amount they can borrow. In the last period of life 
agents consume all wealth except their house, which is inherited by a younger 
generation.   
The model is dynamic and house prices and rents can change through 
time. Indeed, when choosing their housing options agents take into account both the 
rate at which house prices appreciate and the tax treatment on any capital gains that 
they make. Strictly speaking, in the model house prices and rents comprise two parts: 4 
a price level at some base period (t = 0); and a price (or rent) appreciation rate. The 
model calculates the rate of property price appreciation as part of the process by 
which it calculates equilibrium prices; while it is normally the general inflation rate, it 
does not need to be.  
Agents are assumed to be forward looking, so when they choose housing 
in a particular period they take into account not only their current income and 
current housing prices, but their remaining length of life, future house prices, their 
future income stream, and their desired future housing patterns. The model includes 
a careful representation of the conditions imposed by banks on those obtaining 
mortgage finance to purchase a house, including realistic constraints on the minimum 
deposit and the maximum mortgage repayment to income ratio. These constraints 
mean that young households may choose to rent rather than buy a house when 
inflation and nominal interest rates are high, because they cannot obtain suitable 
financing.  
The utility maximisation model generates housing demand for each of the 
agents during each of their life stages, for a given set of rent and house price paths. 
These different housing demand functions are then aggregated together. The 
resulting aggregate demand functions describe how the demand to rent, the demand 
for small houses, and the demand for large houses varies as a function of the rent 
and the price of each type of house, as well as all the basic parameters of the model 
such as income, interest rates, and tax rates.  
Rental accommodation is supplied by agents who become landlords. It is 
assumed that entry into the rental sector is competitive, so landlords bid for houses 
and set rents at levels that leave them indifferent between the after-tax returns from 
lending money and the after-tax returns from investing in residential property. The 
marginal competitive landlord is assumed to be a middle aged agent who is on the 
top marginal income tax rate. Particular care has been taken to ensure that taxes in 
the model replicate the taxes currently imposed on housing in New Zealand. If house 
prices increase over time, a capital gains tax will lower returns to landlords, and, for a 
given level of house prices, rents will be higher than they would otherwise have been.  
Prices are determined endogenously in the model by equating the total 
demand for different types of houses with the supply of different types of houses. 5 
Cost functions describing the costs of building large and small houses are specified 
exogenously in the model, and can take any form. In this model, I focus on the case 
that there are separate upward sloping supply curves for the quantity of large and 
small houses, each with approximately unit elasticities. An elasticity of 1 is broadly 
consistent with the long run increase in prices and the quantity of houses in New 
Zealand between 1960 and 2005. Two different parameterisations that reflect house 
prices that are relatively high or relatively low in comparison to income because of 
high or low construction costs are examined. Several other combinations of supply 
elasticities have also been analysed, including the cases when the supply of both 
classes of houses are either perfectly elastic or perfectly inelastic, and the case that 
the supply of small houses is more elastic than the supply of large houses.  
A solution to the model is obtained by finding a set of prices that equate 
the aggregate demand for different types of housing with the aggregate supply of 
these types of housing. The prices are solved using a complex numerical routine that 
calculates the housing demand for each of the 1600 different households for a set of 
prices, and then chooses a sequence of prices until a set is found at which aggregate 
demand equals aggregate supply. For this equilibrium set of prices, overall demand 
patterns are calculated.  
As Coleman and Scobie (2009) argue, the effect of taxes, inflation, and 
interest rates on the housing market depend on a few crucial elasticities including (i) 
the elasticity of the total supply of houses to the price of houses (the elasticity of the 
supply of housing); (ii) the elasticity of the supply of rental housing with respect to 
rents; (iii) the elasticity of the demand for rental housing with respect to rents and the 
prices of houses; and (iv) the elasticity of the total demand for housing with respect 
to rents and the price of houses. The elasticity of the supply of housing with respect 
to prices is set equal to 1 in the main versions of the model discussed below, but the 
results have also been analysed when this elasticity is near zero or very large. The 
supply of rental housing is perfectly elastic with respect to rent, because landlords are 
assumed to be perfectly competitive and to supply rental housing until the long run 
after-tax return on rental accommodation is equal to the after-tax return on interest 
income. The demand elasticities are not directly imposed, but are implicitly derived 
from the consumer maximisation problem and depend on the basic parameters in the 6 
model. These elasticities can have a major effect on the model’s results and warrant 
further discussion.  
The elasticity of the demand for rental accommodation to housing rentals 
and the prices of houses is a measure of the extent to which households are prepared 
to substitute between renting and home-ownership. This will depend on the relative 
utility households get from sharing, renting, or owning a house. These parameters are 
explicitly specified in the model; typically, households are assumed to gain less utility 
from renting rather than owning, because they can shape an owned house in their 
own image, and less utility from living in shared accommodation than living by 
themselves. The substitutability between rental and owned accommodation will be 
greater the smaller the differences between renting and owning. The more willing 
households are to substitute between rented and owned housing, the less will be the 
utility loss from various housing market imperfections or policy interventions.  
The elasticity of total housing demand, with respect to house prices or 
rents, measures the extent to which new households form when prices change as 
adult children leave home, or as young adults form households by themselves rather 
than sharing with a group of others. This elasticity is important as it is the only 
mechanism by which total housing demand can be altered. The more willing are 
households to share with others, the smaller are the price changes necessary to 
equilibrate the housing market.  
This paper departs from the earlier work by Ortalo-Magne and Rady 
(2006) and Coleman (2008) by introducing a mechanism to substantially increase this 
elasticity. In these earlier papers, the only way households could share was for the 
youngest households to remain at home with their parents. In this paper, the 
youngest two cohorts can share by renting half a house. If they do so, they pay half 
the rent and obtain utility which, while less than the utility of a whole rented house, 
can either be greater than or less than half the utility of a rented house. This option 
proves to be attractive to many households, particularly to those with low incomes or 
steep life cycle earnings, resulting in a higher elasticity of total demand with respect 
to both rent and house prices than in these earlier papers. As a result, smaller price 
changes are needed to induce changes in total housing demand than in these earlier 
papers, and the welfare changes of policy interventions are smaller.  7 
The model analyses the way households climb a “housing ladder” over the 
course of their lives. In large part their ascent can be characterised by two factors: the 
ultimate height they reach and the speed that they attain that height. The ultimate 
height is largely determined by the ratio of life-time income to the user-cost of 
housing: people with higher life-time incomes will be able to afford larger houses 
than people with low lifetime income. In the parameterisations studied a majority of 
people choose a large house in middle age, partly because the tax system favours 
home ownership as imputed rent is not taxed. The speed of ascent is determined by 
the steepness of the earnings profile, interest rates and the availability of credit from 
banks, and the tax incentives facing both households and property investors. In 
equilibrium, the mix of small and large houses in the economy is determined both by 
the length of time spent climbing the housing ladder and the peak rung a household 
attains. Policies that extend the length of time climbing the housing ladder do not, 
however, necessarily reduce the demand for large houses because an agent can use 
the money saved by living in a small house while young to live for longer in a large 
house while old.  
2.2  Modelling capital gains taxes.  
When the inflation rate is positive, income from interest paying assets is 
taxed  more heavily than income from other forms of capital assets because the 
inflation component of nominal interest earnings is taxed, while capital gains are not. 
The asymmetry of this treatment means that the tax system generates an incentive 
for agents to borrow and invest in assets that appreciate over time, potentially 
inducing agents to invest too heavily in residential housing assets, and lowering home 
ownership rates among younger and lower income agents. One possible method to 
eliminate the asymmetrical tax treatment would be to exempt the inflation 
component of interest income from income tax, as it is not income. Another 
potential method would be to impose a capital gains tax on residential property and 
other assets. 
Four different capital gains tax schemes are considered. The first scheme 
treats capital gains as income, and taxes these gains at a taxpayer’s marginal income 
tax rate. Owner-occupied housing is exempt. As landlords are assumed to be higher 
income, middle aged agents, the applicable tax rate is the top marginal tax rate, 33 8 
percent
1
The model’s results when the capital gains of owner-occupied housing are 
taxed are conceptually problematic. Almost no countries apply capital gains taxes to 
owner-occupied housing, for a variety of economic and political reasons. One reason 
is that these taxes are usually only imposed on realised gains when a house is sold, a 
rule that might deter households from moving from one location to another, perhaps 
in response to work opportunities. Another reason concerns the financial hardship 
such a tax could cause when a household dissolves, perhaps because of divorce. 
These negative effects, which may have first order welfare consequences, cannot be 
modelled in this paper and are ignored. To avoid these sorts of issues, it is assumed 
that if a capital gains tax is introduced without an exemption for owner-occupied 
housing, it is imposed on an accruals basis: that is, the household is liable for capital 
gains tax each year, whether or not it is realised through the sale of the house. These 
results are used to provide a reference case for the effect of a capital gains tax. 
. The second scheme also taxes capital gains at the standard marginal income 
tax rates of 20 or 33 percent, but in this case owner-occupied housing is taxed. The 
third scheme imposes a flat rate capital gains tax of 20 percent, with an exemption 
for owner-occupied housing. This tax scheme is similar to that which operates in the 
United States of America. The fourth scheme is similar, except all housing including 
owner-occupied housing is liable to a flat capital gains tax of 20 percent.  
The rate of property price appreciation is an outcome of the model, and 
property prices appreciate in real terms over time when there is population or 
income growth, unless the supply of housing is perfectly elastic. In the results 
presented below, however, there is neither income growth nor population growth 
and so property prices increase at the inflation rate. In these circumstances a capital 
gains tax only taxes the increase in nominal housing wealth that is due to inflation 
and thus it reduces the distortion that arises from the asymmetrical taxation of 
interest income and other assets. Nonetheless, the tax system remains non-neutral 
with respect to the inflation rate because tax rates on real capital income are an 
increasing function of the inflation rate when the inflation component of interest 
income is taxed.   
                                                            
1 The top marginal tax rate in New Zealand is currently 38 percent, although it was 33 before 2000. 
However, most landlords could choose to put a leased property in a trust which is only taxed at 33 
 9 
The revenue raised by taxing capital income and/or capital gains depend 
on both the tax rates and the inflation rate. In the model, any additional revenue 
raised from changes in the tax system or changes in the inflation rate are refunded 
through a change in the Goods and Services Tax (GST) rate, so that the amount of 
tax raised is invariant to the tax system.  
3  Results 
3.1  The effect of inflation 
3.1.1  Price and distributional effects of inflation 
Inflation has three major effects on the housing market. First, it increases 
the rate at which property prices increase in nominal terms, generating nominal 
capital gains for the owners. Since nominal interest earnings rather than real interest 
earnings are taxed, there is an incentive for owners of capital to invest in residential 
housing when the inflation rate is high. This incentive applies to both landlords and 
owner-occupiers, so by itself inflation does not necessarily lead to a decline in the 
home-ownership rate, although it may lead to over investment in residential housing.  
Secondly, inflation may lead to a reduction in nominal rents. This is 
because (i) after tax real returns from interest earning assets decline as the inflation 
rate increases, as the inflation component of interest income is taxed, and (ii) 
landlords get a portion of their return as capital appreciation, and are prepared to pay 
more for houses or to accept less rent in order to become landlords. The balance 
between lower rents and higher prices will depend on the supply elasticity of housing. 
When supply is relatively elastic, and new construction limits the amount property 
prices increase, rents will tend to fall.  
Thirdly, inflation exacerbates the credit constraints facing agents who 
borrow to buy houses. This is because bank imposed restrictions on the amount 
households can borrow are rarely adjusted for inflation, even though nominal interest 
rates increase when the inflation rate rises. If banks do not increase the amount 
credit-constrained households can borrow when nominal debt servicing payments 
increase, it becomes more difficult for these households to purchase houses 
                                                            
percent. I have chosen to solve the model for a top marginal tax rate of 33 percent in part because this 
rate is often seen as a goal by political parties, and in part because of the way landlords can use trusts. 10 
(Modigliani, 1976; Kearl, 1979). In addition, if rents fall, inflation makes it attractive 
for young, credit constrained agents to rent rather than purchase and home 
ownership rates are likely to decline.  
Tables 1a and 1b show how inflation affects long term housing market 
outcomes in the model when there is no capital gains tax and there is an elastic 
supply of housing. In table 1a construction costs and house prices are approximately 
25 percent higher than in table 1b. The tables show how prices and rents, the 
number of houses, the fraction of people owning, and the steady-state level of net 
financial assets vary with the inflation rate. In both cases, a 2 percent increase in the 
inflation rate leads to a 6 percent reduction in rents, a 0.8% reduction in the number 
of houses in the economy, a 3-4 percentage point increase in the fraction of the 
population renting, and a 2-3 percentage increase in the fraction of the housing stock 
that is owned by landlords and leased. More people rent at all ages. Irrespective of 
construction costs, there is a reduction in the number of small houses as the 
combination of falling rents and tighter credit constraints induces more young 
households to share, reducing aggregate demand for housing. The effect on the 
number of large houses in the economy differs in the two cases. When construction 
prices are high, rising inflation increases the total demand for large houses despite 
falling demand among younger cohorts: there is an increase in the demand by older 
households, because of the tax advantages  of using a house as a saving vehicle. 
However, when construction costs are low, most people who want to live in a large 
house can afford to do so for most of their lives, and inflation has a very small effect 
on the quantity of large houses.  
These results are subtly different than those reported in Coleman (2008). 
First, the effect of inflation on homeownership is smaller than reported there, 
because owning half a house is a more attractive option than renting a whole house. 
Secondly, in that model the total demand for housing increased rather than decreased 
as the inflation rate increased. The difference stems from the way the process of 
household formation is modelled. In Coleman (2008), the total number of 
households varies only because of changes in the number of adult children who lived 
with their parents. In that case, a decline in rent attracted children out of the parental 
home and increased the total demand for housing. In this model, the total number of 
households varies because of changes in the number of young adults who live by 11 
themselves rather than with others. In this case a decline in rents could either lead to 
an increase in the total demand for housing, as agents decide to stop sharing and rent 
by themselves, or a reduction in the total demand for housing, as agents decide to 
stop owning, and rent shared accommodation instead. In the parameterisations 
studied in this paper the latter effect dominates, so that total housing demand 
decreases as inflation increases, credit constraints intensify, and rents decline
2
3.1.2  The welfare effects of inflation 
.  
In keeping with earlier work by Modigliani (1976), Kearl (1979), and 
Feldstein (1996, 1997), Coleman (2008) argued inflation reduced the welfare of many 
but not all households because of binding credit constraints on young agents. In the 
model, inflation has a large effect on young people because almost all agents would 
increase their utility if they could borrow more when young, either to smooth 
consumption in the face of rising life-cycle income, or to buy a house, or both. They 
do not borrow more because banks only make collateral backed loans. In this 
environment, inflation has ambiguous effects on welfare. Those agents who wish to 
purchase a house find inflation tightens credit constraints, because nominal interest 
rates increase and banks do not change their lending terms and conditions to make 
an allowance for the way inflation reduces the real value of the nominal outstanding 
debt. This makes it more difficult for the agents whose real incomes increase over 
time to smooth consumption, for they have to reduce their consumption to make 
higher nominal interest payments if they purchase a house. In contrast, those agents 
who rent benefit from inflation, because it lowers the rent they pay and enables them 
to spend more while young than they otherwise could. 
Whether inflation causes welfare losses or improvements on average 
depends on the relative size of the populations that rent and own when young. In 
turn, this depends on the ratio of house prices to incomes. When construction costs 
are high, a large fraction of young people will wish to share accommodation with 
others rather than live in a house alone. In this case inflation increases their welfare, 
because it reduces the negative effects of borrowing constraints that prevent them 
from smoothing their consumption through time. When construction costs are 
                                                            
2 Whether or not sharing is attractive will depend on the relative utility of sharing compared to renting 
a whole house. The model was solved for several different parameterisations in which the utility from 
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lower, or social norms make it normal for young adults to either live with family or 
live by themselves, inflation lowers welfare by making it harder for young agents to 
buy their first homes. In the parameterisations analysed in this paper, inflation is on 
balance welfare enhancing because there are more agents who benefit from lower 
rents than there are agents who suffer from higher interest payments at the start of 
the mortgage. In Coleman (2008), the latter effect dominated, so inflation lowered 
welfare for most people. This difference reflects two sets of parameter changes: the 
current model allows agents to share housing with each other, rather than just their 
parents; and it has a higher house price to income ratio, which reduces the 
attractiveness of home ownership at young ages even when the inflation rate is zero. 
In the real world, which of these two competing effects dominates is an empirical 
matter. The answer will depend in part on the social mores and conventions of 
society, particularly the acceptability of sharing housing with non-family members. 
Inflation causes one additional welfare effect in the model: it changes the 
equilibrium number of houses and house prices, which changes the user costs of 
housing. If inflation leads to an increase in total housing demand, because lower 
rents entice adult children to leave home earlier, house prices will rise. This tends to 
lower the welfare of other agents, because the user cost of housing rises and these 
agents have less to spend on other goods
3
3.2  The effect of capital gains taxes with an exemption for owner-
occupied housing.  
. This effect is an example of the negative 
pecuniary externality that occurs when agents disregard the effect of their actions on 
the prices paid by other members of the economy. In contrast, if total housing 
demand falls in response to inflation, house prices fall, and the welfare of other 
agents increases. In the parameterisations analysed in this paper, inflation lowers total 
housing demand, so there is a small positive pecuniary externality that improves the 
welfare of all agents because of lower house prices.  
Tables 2a and 2b show the long term effects of capital gains taxes when 
the inflation rate is two percent, owner-occupied housing is exempt, and there is an 
elastic housing supply. The parameterisations are consistent with tables 1a and 1b, 
                                                            
sharing half a house was either less than or more than half the utility from renting a whole house. In 
all of the parameterisations analysed, an increase in inflation led to a decline in the total housing stock. 13 
with construction costs and house prices approximately 25 percent higher in table 2a 
than in table 2b. The first columns show the equilibrium values of various aspects of 
the housing market under current tax regulations. The second and third columns 
shows how these values change when capital gains are treated as income and taxed at 
marginal income tax rates (20%, 33%) and when capital gains are taxes at a flat rate 
20 percent rate. Note that most landlords are high income agents, so the former 
scheme is effectively a flat rate capital gains tax with a 33 percent tax rate. The fourth 
column shows how these values change when the inflation component of interest 
income is exempt from income tax. In each case, there is neither income nor 
population growth and property prices appreciate at the inflation rate. Consequently, 
when the inflation rate is zero a capital gains tax has no effect. 
3.2.1  Taxing capital gains on leased property at marginal income tax rates 
The main effect of the (20%, 33%) capital gains tax is to increase rents by 
approximately $1300 or 11 percent (table 2a)
4
The decline in renting is most noticeable among older households. Among 
younger (cohort 0 and 1) households, renting only declines modestly, for credit 
constraints are sufficiently tight on most low income agents that renting is still more 
attractive than home ownership, particularly as most of these agents share rental 
housing and thus only experience half of the rent increase.  In both tables 2a and 2b, 
2.5 – 3.5 percent of cohort 0 and cohort 1 cease renting. In contrast, middle-aged 
and retired households almost completely cease renting, because the capital gains tax 
raises the long run cost of renting above the cost of owning as only landlords pay the 
.  There is also a small increase in house 
prices, by 0.6 –  0.8 percent. The latter occurs because the demand for property 
increases: the increase in rents makes renting less attractive and there are a number of 
agents who cease living in shared rental accommodation and purchase and live in a 
house by themselves. 
                                                            
3 Annual consumption falls by approximately the real interest rate multiplied by the additional housing 
cost. Higher house prices also lower the net foreign asset position. 
4 Small house prices are $225000, so the capital gain is $4500 when the inflation rate is 2 percent; if the 
landlord has to pay 33 percent of this sum in tax, the rent has to be raised to make the same after tax 
return as investing in interest earning assets. The $1300 increase in rent is not exactly equal to 0.33* 
$4500 for two reasons. First, in the model the timing convention is that the landlord is paid rent and 
pays income tax at the start of the period, but pays capital gains tax at the end of the period. The after-
income-tax value of the $1300 rent increase is invested for the length of the period (in this case 12.5 
years); in this case the extra interest is approximately the same value as the income tax paid. Secondly, 
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capital gains tax. The total effect of the capital gains tax on the rental market depends 
on the number of people initially renting, which depends on construction costs and 
house prices. When construction costs are high, a large number of agents rent under 
the current tax rules and a capital gains tax reduces the fraction of agents renting by 
over six percentage points; when they are low, fewer middle aged and older agents 
rent, and the capital gains tax only reduces the fraction renting by three percent.  
There are two other economic effects. First, the simulations indicate the 
capital gains tax raises little revenue, for the GST rate only declines by 0.1 percentage 
points. This is partly because the capital gains tax reduces the number of rental 
houses, and thus leads to a reduction in the income tax paid by landlords on their 
rental income. Secondly, the simulations suggest that there is a small increase in the 
net financial asset position of the economy. The amount is larger when construction 
costs are high rather than low, and reflects the increase in saving that occurs as some 
households switch from being life-time renters to middle-aged home-owners due to 
the increase in rents.  
3.2.2  Taxing capital gains on leased property at a constant 20% rate 
The results are qualitatively similar if the capital gains tax is applied at a 
flat 20 percent rate, except the effects are quantitatively smaller as the average tax 
rate is 20 percent rather than 33 percent. The increase in rents is only 60 percent as 
large, and there is a correspondingly smaller decrease in the fraction of agents that 
rent and the fraction of houses that are leased. Interestingly, more revenue is raised 
under the lower flat rate capital gains tax when construction costs are high, as there is 
a much smaller decline in renting. Nonetheless, the amount of tax raised under either 
capital gains tax regime is small and the reduction in GST is less than 0.2 percent in 
either case.  
3.2.3  Taxing capital gains on leased property: results for other supply functions 
When the supply of small house is elastic but the supply of large houses is 
inelastic, the results are similar to the case when both the supply curves are elastic. 
Once again, the primary effect of the capital gains tax is to increase rents, reduce the 
                                                            
property prices increase by approximately 1 percent once the CGT is introduced, leading to a 1% or 
$100 increase in rents. 15 
fraction of the population that is renting and the fraction of the housing stock that is 
leased, and increase the total housing stock.  
When both supply curves are inelastic, the results are a little different. In 
table 2c, the number of flats and houses is constant and, because there is an overall 
shortage, prices are high. As before, a capital gains tax raises rents and reduces the 
number of people renting, particularly amongst those who are middle aged or retired. 
However, house prices increase quite sharply, by four or five percent. The house 
price increase is needed to reduce the total demand for housing, because an increase 
in rents without an increase in house prices leads to a reduction in the number of 
agents sharing rental accommodation and an increase in the total demand for 
housing. The only way to reduce the total demand for housing is to raise house 
prices, and make it attractive to share. When the supply of housing is elastic, the 
price rise is not necessary, as new houses are built to meet the additional demand. If 
a rise in rents lead to a reduction in total demand, because some young agents 
responded to the increase in rents by moving back to their parents’ home, a capital 
gains tax could lead to a fall in house prices as well as an increase in rents. 
Consequently, the way prices would behave in New Zealand if a capital gains tax 
were introduced will depend on the size of the elasticity of total demand for housing 
to rent. 
3.3  Exempting the inflation component of interest from income tax 
Coleman (2008) argued that the tax system would have less effect on the 
housing market if the inflation component of interest income were exempt from 
income tax. He argued that by exempting the inflation component of interest income 
from tax, and by only allowing the deduction of real rather than nominal interest 
payments, landlords would have less incentive to enter the property market when the 
inflation rate was positive, raising rents and home ownership rates.   
The fourth columns of tables 2a – 2c show what happens if neither capital 
gains nor the inflation component of interest income were taxed. In all of the 
housing supply versions considered, the effects on rents, prices, and home ownership 
rates are similar to what happens if a flat 20 percent capital gains tax regime with an 
exemption for owner-occupiers were introduced. There are two differences, 
however. Because tax revenue declines slightly when the inflation component of 16 
interest income is exempted from income tax, the GST rate has to be increased 
slightly, rather than cut. The increase is always less than 0.2 percentage points, 
however, partly because the loss of tax on interest income is offset by a reduction in 
the deductions allowable against rental income. Secondly, there is a larger increase in 
the net financial asset position than in either of the capital gains tax regimes 
considered.  This is because exempting the inflation component of interest income 
from tax raises after tax real interest rates, encouraging saving and capital 
accumulation among working age agents
5
3.4  The effect of an accrual capital gains regime applied to all agents 
. Since a capital gains tax does not affect 
after tax interest rates, after tax returns are higher when the inflation component of 
interest is tax exempt than when a capital gains tax is introduced. 
Table 3 shows what happens to the housing market if capital gains taxes 
are applied to all households on an accruals basis, either as a flat rate (20%) or at 
marginal income tax rates (20%, 33%).The results are for the case that the housing 
supply is elastic and construction costs are high, but the results for other housing 
supply parameters are qualitatively similar.  
The capital gains tax leads to an increase in rents. When the capital gains 
tax rate is a flat 20 percent, there is little effect on the quantity of housing rented, 
however, because owner-occupiers are also liable for capital gains tax, so the cost of 
owning a house rises by a similar amount. There is a significant switch from large 
houses to small houses, however, as the capital gains tax raises the user cost of large 
houses by more than the user cost of small houses. This reduces the demand for 
large houses at all ages. The substitution between large and small houses also occurs 
because of a sizeable drop in the GST rate that makes the consumption of goods 
relatively more attractive than the consumption of housing. The capital gains tax 
revenue is much larger than when owner-occupied housing is exempt, and the GST 
rate declines by over two percentage points rather than 0.2 percentage points.  
When capital gains are taxed as income at marginal income tax rates, there 
is a substantial decline in the number of middle-aged and retired households renting. 
                                                            
5  While the model has a steady state saving rate of zero, as people run down the assets they 
accumulate while working when they are retired, the economy’s net asset position increases when the 
saving rate among working age people increases. 17 
This is because rents increase by more than the amount of capital gains tax that 
would be paid by low income renters, so it is cheaper in the long term for low 
income households to purchase rather than rent. Indeed, the reduction in the 
number of households renting is similar to when owner-occupied housing is exempt 
from capital gains tax.  
In this model, the effects of a capital gains tax applied to all households 
are very similar to the effects of a flat rate property tax. This is because property 
prices increase at the inflation rate, so a flat rate capital gains end up taxing houses at 
a rate that is proportional to value. Coleman and Grimes (2009) discuss the effects of 
introducing a property tax at greater length.  
3.5  The welfare implications of capital gains taxes 
The above analysis suggests that capital gains taxes raise rents, increase 
home-ownership rates, cause a substitution towards smaller houses, and improve the 
net foreign asset position because they reduce the distortions caused by the 
interaction of inflation with the tax system. Whether capital gains taxes raise welfare, 
however, will depend on two things: the extent to which inflation reduces welfare, 
because of its negative effects on credit-constrained owner-occupiers; and/or the 
extent to which inflation enhances welfare because of its positive effects on credit-
constrained renters. In the parameterisations of the model studied in this paper, the 
welfare losses to the renters exceed the benefits to the owners, for there are more 
young renters than young owners. In this case, a capital gains tax will tend to have 
negative welfare effects as it raises rents, although this need not be the case.  
Figure 1 shows how different tax schemes affect lifetime welfare for 
people with different income levels when the supply of housing is elastic and 
construction costs are low. The figure shows the average change in utility for each 
income decile
6
                                                            
6 The effects on the welfare of the lowest decile are not shown as they largely reflect the inheritance 
arrangements in the economy. In these simulations odd numbered agents receive no inheritance, but 
even number agents inherit the houses of the two retired agents with the same rank in the income 
distribution. When there are no capital gains taxes, most decile one agents rent throughout their lives 
and neither leave an inheritance nor receive one. When a capital gains tax is introduced, many of these 
agents buy a house, and bequeath it in old age. The logic of the model means that even-numbered 
. Three points stand out. First, a capital gains tax scheme that exempts 
owner-occupied housing has lower welfare for most people than one which does not. 
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Secondly, a capital gains tax scheme that exempts owner-occupied housing reduces 
welfare for most low income people, because of the increase in rents. Thirdly, a 
capital gains tax scheme that exempts owner-occupied housing has similar welfare 
properties as a tax scheme that exempts the inflation component of interest income 
from tax. These three results occurred in most of the parameterisations studied, even 
though the exact nature of the welfare changes depends on a number of factors such 
as the housing supply elasticities and the way people inherit property.   
Several features of these results are of interest. First, a capital gains tax 
scheme without an exemption for owner-occupied housing has very similar 
properties to the flat rate property tax scheme analysed by Coleman and Grimes 
(2009). As discussed above, this is not surprising, for in the model taxing capital gains 
on an accrual basis when the inflation rate is constant is like having a flat rate 
property tax. Since the welfare effects are similar, and since the effects on rents, 
prices, and home-ownership rates are similar, a flat rate property tax could be a 
substitute for a capital gains tax if it were believed the inflation rate would continue 
to be low and stable. Given the political difficulties of introducing a capital gains tax 
on owner-occupied residential housing in other countries, a flat rate property tax may 
be an attractive option. 
Secondly, the welfare properties of capital gains regimes that do or do not 
exempt owner-occupied housing are significantly different, even though they have a 
similar effect on rents. The differences are caused by two factors. First, when owner-
occupied housing is taxed, much more tax is collected. The consequent cut in the 
GST rate partially compensates renters for the rise in rents, and leads directly to an 
improvement in their welfare.  In addition, there is a reduction in the total demand 
for property, so house prices fall relative to the case that only landlords pay the tax. 
This leads to a reduction in the direct user cost of housing to all agents. This 
provides a gain to all agents in the economy except the first generation, who suffer a 
capital loss.  
Thirdly, a tax regime that exempts the inflation component of interest 
income from tax has similar welfare properties as a tax regime that taxes capital gains 
                                                            
agents also inherit one or more houses, and are much better off. Although this effect dominates the 
welfare calculations for the lowest income decile, This result is not emphasised in this paper. 19 
tax on leased residential property. Again, it may be politically easier to introduce such 
a tax regime than a capital gains tax.  
Figure 2 shows the welfare effects of different tax regimes when the 
supply of housing is elastic but construction costs are high. The results are similar, 
although there is a downwards spike in the 6th decile that reflects the effect of 
inheritance arrangements. (In this case it reflects the change  that occurs when people 
start inheriting large houses rather than smaller houses.) Once again, the welfare 
consequences of a capital gains tax that includes owner-occupiers are better than a 
tax that does not; the welfare consequences of capital gains tax regimes that exclude 
owner-occupiers are negative for low-income agents because the taxes increase rents; 
and the welfare consequences of capital gains taxes that exempt owner-occupiers are 
similar to the welfare consequences of tax regimes that exempt the interest 
component of interest income from tax. The welfare losses for low income agents 
are higher when construction costs are high, partly because more people rent but also 
because rents are higher and thus increases in rents cause more severe cuts in 
consumption.  
4  Discussion and conclusions 
This paper has explored some of the consequences of introducing a capital 
gains tax on residential property in New Zealand. It has done this in the context of a 
stylised model that attempts to understand the factors that determine housing market 
outcomes in the long term. The model focuses on three main factors: the cost of 
supplying new housing; the financial incentives facing landlords; and the tax and 
financial incentives facing households as they choose different housing options over 
the course of their lives.  
The model suggests that a capital gains tax will have the following effects: 
it will lead to an increase in rents; it will lead to a reduction in the number of people 
renting, and an increase in homeownership rates; it will lead to an increase in the net 
foreign asset position; and it will lead to a decline in the fraction of large houses in 
the economy.  It is possible that homeownership rates could rise by several percent if 
a capital gains tax were introduced, with a similar sized increase in the net foreign 
asset position.  20 
Two other results seem general. First, a capital gains tax that exempted 
owner-occupied housing would raise little revenue, whereas one that applied to all 
households would raise enough to allow a sizeable reduction in the GST rate. For 
this reason, low income households that rent are better off when a capital gains tax 
does not have exemptions. Secondly, the increase in rents and the increase in home-
ownership rates will be larger if the capital gains tax rates on owner-occupied 
residential property are lower than those on leased residential property, either 
because the former is specifically exempted from capital gains tax or because 
landlords typically have higher marginal tax rates than households who typically rent.  
Beyond these general outcomes, the paper demonstrates that the welfare 
implications of a capital gains tax depend a lot on the detailed structure of the 
economy. It matters whether the supply of housing is elastic or inelastic. It matters 
whether construction costs are high or low. It matters whether people prefer to own 
rather than rent. It matters whether young people respond to rent increases by 
sharing with more people, or by deciding to buy a house themselves. Indeed, some of 
these factors matter so much that they determine whether a capital gains tax is largely 
beneficial or harmful.  
It is both a weakness and a strength of the modelling approach that it 
cannot be more definitive about the welfare effects of a capital gains tax. From a 
technical perspective, the weakness is clear: a model that delivers different answers 
when the housing choice set is structured differently makes it difficult to know 
whether the model’s outcomes are robust or contrived. The strength is more subtle: 
the modelling approach suggests that the welfare effect of different policies depend a 
lot on several deep parameters in the models, suggesting empirical research on the 
nature of these parameters is important before policies are introduced.  
This paper has ignored many of the practical and political issues that 
would have to be solved if capital gains taxes were to be introduced. While the 
simulations of the model suggest a capital gains tax that includes owner-occupied 
housing has better welfare properties than a capital gains tax that does not, the 
political and practical difficulties of introducing an accruals based capital gains tax 
should not be underestimated. Applying a capital gains tax only to realised gains has 
its own problems, notably the incentives it generates to remain in unsuitable houses 
or living arrangements in order to avoid the tax. Yet the simulations also suggest that 21 
a flat rate property tax has many of the same properties as an accrual based capital 
gains tax with no exemptions, and if a capital gains tax is desired but not considered 
practical this may be a suitable alternative. The similarity between these two taxes will 
be greater if nominal property price appreciation is dominated by inflation rather 
than real factors, and if the inflation rate is relatively stable.  
Most OECD countries that have capital gains taxes exempt owner-
occupied housing from the tax and only tax leased residential property when a sale is 
realised. This is a much more straightforward tax to implement than an accruals 
based tax, but still removes some of the housing market distortions that arise from 
taxing differently that inflation component of interest earnings and the inflation 
component of capital gains. Nonetheless, the simulations suggest the effects of this 
type of capital gains tax could be largely replicated by exempting the inflation 
component of interest income from tax, a strategy that may be easier to implement in 
practice. Such a strategy would have the added advantage that real after-tax interest 
rates and returns to capital are unaffected by the inflation rate.  
The key issue underlying the whole paper is whether the effects of 
moderate inflation on the housing market largely lowers or improves welfare. In line 
with earlier work, this paper identifies two ways that inflation affects welfare. First, 
inflation makes it more difficult for people to purchase a house, or upgrade to a 
bigger house, because nominal interest rates increase and banks do not change their 
lending criteria to recognise the way inflation erodes the real value of the existing 
debt. This is the familiar issue of mortgage tilt, which lowers welfare (Modigliani, 
1976.) Secondly, inflation leads to lower rents if interest earning assets are taxed 
more heavily than capital gains. This improves the welfare of those who are credit 
constrained and rent. Whether the effect of inflation on the housing market 
improves or lowers welfare therefore depends on the fractions of the population 
who find it eases rather tightens the credit constraints they face. In this paper, I have 
focussed on parameterisations in which inflation raises welfare for many agents, 
while in earlier work I focused on the case that inflation lowered welfare. In practice, 
this is an empirical question, the answer of which will depend on the cost of housing 
and the way agents value renting and home-ownership. If, under the current tax 
system, inflation lowers rents and raises the welfare of many people, policies that 
counteract the effects of inflation on the housing market will tend to lower welfare. 22 
Conversely, if inflation mainly causes hardship among those who wish to borrow to 
purchase a house, a capital gains tax will raise welfare. 23 
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6  Tables 
Table 1a: The effect of inflation on housing outcomes 
Elastic supply, high construction costs 
 
  Π=0  Π=1  Π=2  Π=3 
Rent  11900  11650  11250  10850 
PF(0) (small)   225200  224500  223600  222700 
PH(0) (large)   382900  382400  382000  381400 
 
NTOT (all) /popn  93.9%  93.6%  93.1%  92.8% 
NF (small) /popn  53.0%  52.4%  51.4%  50.6% 
NH (large) /popn  40.9%  41.1%  41.8%  42.1% 
         
% houses rented  10.7%  12.2%  13.6%  15.1% 
% agents renting  16.1%  17.9%  19.5%  21.2% 
% cohort 0 renting  38%  41%  43%  44% 
% cohort 1 renting  11%  13%  16%  17% 
% others renting  8%  9%  10%  12% 
% cohort 1 large  60%  58.5%  57.5%  56% 
 
GST rate  12.3%  12.1%  12.0%  12.0% 
Net financial 
assets/GDP 
28%  29%  31%  33% 
The table shows how rents, house prices, house numbers (number of houses divided by the 
population) and the fraction of the population that rents vary with the inflation rate. Net financial 
assets/GDP is total lending minus total borrowing divided by labour income. 
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Table 1b: The effect of inflation on housing outcomes 
Elastic supply, low construction costs 
 
Rent  9650  9350  9050  8700 
PF(0) (small)   182400  181300  180500  179500 
PH(0) (large)   325600  324400  323800  322300 
 
NTOT (all)  96.8%  96.4%  96.1%  95.6% 
NF (small)  42.8%  42.5%  42.0%  42.1% 
NH (large)  54.1%  53.9%  54.1%  53.5% 
 
% houses rented  3.6%  5.3%  6.7%  7.9% 
% agents renting  6.6%  8.7%  10.4%  11.9% 
% cohort 0 renting  25%  26%  28%  30% 
% cohort 1 renting  1%  4%  6%  8% 
% others renting  1%  2%  3%  5% 
%cohort 1 large  71.5%  71%  71%  70% 
 
GST rate  12.0%  11.8%  11.5%  11.5% 
Net financial 
assets/GDP  48%  48%  50%  53% 
The table shows how rents, house prices, house numbers (number of houses divided by the 
population) and the fraction of the population that rents vary with the inflation rate. Net financial 




Table 2a: The effects of capital gains taxes on residential property; owner-
occupied housing exempt, inflation rate  = 2 percent. 
Elastic supply, high construction costs 
 
  Change from introducing …… 






of interest tax 
exempt 
Rent  11250  +$750  +$1300  +$800 
PF(0) (small)   223600  +$1000  +$1800  +$900 
PH(0) (large)   382000  +$900  +$1800  +$700 
 
NTOT (all) /popn  93.1%  0.4%  0.8%  0.4% 
NF (small) /popn  51.4%  0.6%  0.9%  0.7% 
NH (large) /popn  41.8%  -0.2%  -0.1%  -0.3% 
 
% houses rented  13.6%  -3.8%  -6.2%  -3.5% 
% agents renting  19.5%  -3.9%  -6.5%  -3.6% 
% cohort 0 renting  42.5%  -2.0%  -3.5%  -2.3% 
% cohort 1 renting  15.5%  -1.0%  -2.5%  -1.8% 
% others renting  10.0%  -6.3%  -10.0%  -5.3% 
 
GST rate  12.0%  -0.2%  -0.1%  0.1% 
Net financial assets 
/GDP  30.6%  2.2%  4.1%  7.0% 
The table shows how rents, house prices, house numbers (number of houses divided by the 
population) and the fraction of the population that rents would change if a capital gains tax exempting 
owner-occupiers were introduced. The inflation  rate is assumed to be 2 percent. Net financial 
assets/GDP is total lending minus total borrowing divided by labour income.  
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Table 2b: The effects of capital gains taxes on residential property; owner-
occupied housing exempt, inflation rate  = 2 percent. 
Elastic supply, low construction costs 
 
  Change from introducing …… 






of interest tax 
exempt 
Rent  9050  +$600  +$1050  +$650 
PF(0) (small)   180500  +$1100  +$1500  +$1200 
PH(0) (large)   323800  +$1100  +$1600  +$1300 
 
NTOT (all) /popn  96.1%  0.4%  0.6%  0.5% 
NF (small) /popn  42.0%  0.4%  0.5%  0.4% 
NH (large) /popn  54.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1% 
 
% houses rented  6.7%  -2.3%  -2.6%  -2.6% 
% agents renting  10.4%  -2.7%  -3.1%  -2.9% 
% cohort 0 renting  28.3%  -1.8%  -3.0%  -2.3% 
% cohort 1 renting  6.3%  -2.0%  -2.5%  -2.5% 
% others renting  3.5%  -3.5%  -3.5%  -3.5% 
 
GST rate  11.5%  0.0%  0.0%  0.3% 
Net financial assets 
/GDP  50.0%  1.2%  1.3%  7.1% 
The table shows how rents, house prices, house numbers (number of houses divided by the 
population) and the fraction of the population that rents would change if a capital gains tax exempting 
owner-occupiers were introduced. The inflation rate is assumed to be 2 percent. Net financial 
assets/GDP is total lending minus total borrowing divided by labour income. 
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Table 2c: The effects of capital gains taxes on residential property; owner-
occupied housing exempt, inflation rate  = 2 percent. 
Inelastic supply, high prices  
 
  Change from introducing …… 






of interest tax 
exempt 
Rent  11350  +$1100  +$1850  +$1100 
PF(0) (small)   225900  +$7000  +$11000  +$6300 
PH(0) (large)   378300  +$5000  +$16300  +$6200 
 
NTOT (all) /popn  93.2%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
NF (small) /popn  50.1%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
NH (large) /popn  43.1%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
 
% houses rented  13.3%  -2.6%  -5.1%  -2.4% 
% agents renting  19.2%  -2.4%  -4.7%  -2.3% 
% cohort 0 renting  42.0%  -0.5%  0.3%  -0.3% 
% cohort 1 renting  15.3%  0.8%  0.5%  -0.3% 
% others renting  9.8%  -5.0%  -9.8%  -4.3% 
 
GST rate  11.9%  -0.2%  -0.2%  0.1% 
Net financial assets 
/GDP  32.0%  2.1%  3.4%  7.5% 
The table shows how rents, house prices, house numbers (number of houses divided by the 
population) and the fraction of the population that rents would change if a capital gains tax exempting 
owner-occupiers were introduced. The inflation rate is assumed to be 2 percent. Net financial 
assets/GDP is total lending minus total borrowing divided by labour income.  
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Table 3: The effects of capital gains taxes on all households; π = 2. 
Elastic supply, high prices 
  Change from introducing taxes on …… 
All households  landlords only 










Rent  11250  +$700  +$1200  +$750  +$1300 
PF(0) (small)   223600  -$100  +$400  +$1000  +$1800 
PH(0) (large)   382000  -$2100  -$1500  +$900  +$1800 
           
NTOT (all) /popn  93.1%  0.0%  0.2%  0.4%  0.8% 
NF (small) /popn  51.4%  2.5%  2.6%  0.6%  0.9% 
NH (large) /popn  41.8%  -2.5%  -2.4%  -0.2%  -0.1% 
           
% houses rented  13.6%  -0.4%  -5.4%  -3.8%  -6.2% 
% agents renting  19.5%  -0.3%  -5.1%  -3.9%  -6.5% 
% cohort 0 renting  42.5%  0.8%  -0.8%  -2.0%  -3.5% 
% cohort 1 renting  15.5%  -1.0%  -0.8%  -1.0%  -2.5% 
% others renting  10.0%  -0.5%  -9.5%  -6.3%  -10.0% 
           
GST rate  12.0%  -2.2%  -2.5%  -0.2%  -0.1% 
Net financial assets 
/GDP  30.6%  0.8%  6.5%  2.2%  4.1% 
The table shows how rents, house prices, house numbers (number of houses divided by the 
population) and the fraction of the population that rents would change if a capital gains tax on all 
houses were introduced. The inflation rate is assumed to be 2 percent. Net financial assets/GDP is 
total lending minus total borrowing divided by labour income.  31 
Table 4. Parameterisation of the model. 
Parameter  Description  Value   Source/Rationale 
T  Length of period   12.5 years  To approximate work 
history from age 25 – 75  
0
t Y   Average income 
of 25-35 cohort 
50000  NZ Census 2001: average 
male and female earnings, 
25-35 year olds, are 
$32800 and $23300 
respectively 





i g   Lifecycle income  
pattern 
{1, 1.5, 1.5, 
0.15+20000} 
NZ Census, 1966-  2001. 
Based on real lifecycle 
earnings of cohort turning 
20 in 1946, 1961.  





















i κ   Inheritance 
timing 
{0,0,1,0}  Arbitrary 
γ   Annual house 
maintenance 
0.01   Arbitrary 
Η  Mortgage term  25 years  Standard mortgage term in 
1990s 
δ  Maximum debt 
service-income 
ratio 
30%  Reflects NZ banking 
conditions 
Θ  Maximum loan to 
value ratio 
90%  Reflects NZ banking 
conditions 
* g τ   Target GST rate  0.14  Tax take equals 14% of 
labour income; arbitrary, 
but close to NZ rate. 
*




Reflects NZ rates in 2000. 
 
Housing Supply parameters 
01 ,
FF αα  
01 ,






approximately 1% price 
elasticity for flats. 





  Inelastic 
High Price 
-149m, 100000 
-68m,   100000 
Generates NF = 689 
NH = 802 
  Inelastic 
Low Price 
-153m, 100000 
-83m,   100000 
Generates NF = 665 
NH = 873 





NH = 800 
  Perfectly elastic  PF = 225000 
PH = 370000 
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Change in utility assoiated with different tax regimes




27500 32000 37000 41500 45500 49500 53500 57500 61500
After tax income
All HH, 20 20




Change in utility assoiated with different tax regimes




27500 32000 37000 41500 45500 49500 53500 57500 61500
After tax income
All HH, 20 20





8  Appendix 1 
This appendix provides a formal description of the model. The same model is used 
by Coleman and Grimes (2009). The building blocks of the model are equations 
describing the supply and demand for two different types of houses, small houses 
(denoted F for flats) and large houses (denoted H). The demand for these houses are 
derived from the preferences of four separate cohorts of agents. Each cohort 
comprises a number of different agents. The N agents in each cohort live for four 
periods T = 12.5 years long labelled i = {0,1,2,3}.  
 
A1.1 Agents, housing options, and inheritances 
In period t, agent j born in period t-i has real pre-tax labour income  
   
,0 ij
t j iti Y gY ω − =   (1) 
where    j ω   = idiosyncratic factor affecting agent j relative to average    
    cohort earnings;  
    i g   =  factor reflecting the life-cycle earnings of the cohort in   
    its i
th period; and  
   
0
ti Y −  = average income of cohort at time of birth. 
While any pattern of income is possible, agents are assumed to have a constant place 
in the within-cohort income distribution as they age. Agent 1 has the lowest income. 
Nominal income is 
, ij
tt PY , where  t P  is the pre-tax price of the good.  Agents pay 
taxes on their nominal incomes
7
                                                            
7 In Coleman (2008) only capital income, not labour income was taxed.  
. There are two marginal tax rates: τ1 for agents with 
real income in period t less than τ
*; and τ2 ≥ τ1 for agents with real income greater 
than or equal to τ
*.  It is assumed that the tax threshold is automatically adjusted for 34 
inflation. An indirect goods and services tax is applied to goods other than housing at 
rate 
g τ , so the post tax price of the good is (1 )
g
t P τ + . Incomes and the prices of 
goods both increase at a constant inflation rate π, where 1 π +   1 tt PP + = . 
 




, , and has housing choices described by a vector of four 
indicator variables 
,, ijh
t I ={ }
1
2 ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,,
ij R ijR ijF ijH
t ttt I III that equal one if the agent has 
housing tenure h in period i of his or her life at time t, and zero otherwise. There are 
four possible housing tenures: an agent can share a rented small house (or flat) with 
another agent (½R), rent a small house or flat by themselves (R), purchase a small 
house (F), or purchase a large house (H).  In period t agents obtain utility  
   
, ,, , ,, ( , ) ln( )
ij ijh ij h ijh
tt t t
h
uc c vI = + ∑ I   (2) 
It is assumed 
HFR vvv >>and 
11
22 2
RR R v vv ≥>. Agents born at time t choose 
consumption and housing paths to maximise discounted lifetime utility: 









U uc β ++
=
=∑ I    (3) 
In each period, agents choose one of the four housing options, so there are 256 
possible housing patterns over a lifetime. Rather than calculate the utility of each of 
these patterns, agents are restricted to choose from a much smaller set of patterns, . 
The three restrictions are: (i) only period 0 and period 1 agents may choose to share a 
rental property (½R); (ii) except in the last period, agents’ housing choices must not 
worsen through time; and (iii) agents can only rent in the last period if they rent or 
share throughout their whole life.   By this means, the set   is reduced to  31 
members,   ={½R½RRR, ½R½RRF, ½R½RFF, ½R½RHF, ½R½RHH, ½RRRR, 35 
½RRRF, ½RRFF, ½RRHF, ½RRHH, ½RFFF, ½RFHF, ½RFHH, ½RHHF, 
½RHHH, RRRR, RRRF, RRFF, RRHF, RRHH, RFFF, RFHF, RFHH, RHHF, 
RHHH, FFFF, FFHF, FFHH, FHHF, FHHH, HHHF, HHHH}. An agent’s 
optimal discounted utility is calculated for each of these patterns, and the agent is 
assumed to choose the pattern that provides the greatest discounted utility. 
 
Households receive their income, borrow or lend, consume, and purchase, rent, or 
sell property at the start of each period, although they gain utility from housing by 
living in it throughout the period. In the last period, agents sell or realise all assets 
except their last owned housing unit, repay any debts, and consume all of their 
wealth. They die at the end of period 3, at which point their housing unit is 
distributed to younger cohorts.  At time t a fraction  i κ  is left to the cohort born at t-i 
for i=0,1,2; in this paper,  2 1 κ = , so that agents do not receive an inheritance until 
relatively late in life. Two inheritance distributions were considered. In the first one, 
the housing belong to the jth agent in cohort 3 is left to the jth agent in cohort 2, 
thus preserving the income distribution. In the second one (and the main one used in 
the simulations in this paper) the houses owned by agents j and j+1 in cohort 3 are 
left to agent j+1 in cohort 2, and agent j gets no inheritance. This distribution 
ensures that half the agents in the model solve optimisation problems in which an 
inheritance is not taken into account, while the other half solve problems in which 
credit constraints bind particularly hard early in life because they expect to inherit a 
large amount of wealth. In the maximisation equation below, Inheritt is the value of 





A1.2 Taxes and the housing market 
Five features of the tax system have been incorporated into the model. First, interest 
and rent income is taxed at an agent’s marginal tax rate. Secondly, there is a goods 
and services tax that is applied to consumption but not to rent or property. In the 
model, the goods and service tax rate is set endogenously at a rate that makes the 
total tax take except for labour income taxes (tax on capital income plus tax on 
goods and services plus capital gains taxes) equal to a set fraction of labour income, 
in this case 
* 14
g τ = percent. This ensures that any changes in the structure of capital 
incomes taxes do not have revenue implications for the Government. Thirdly, 
imputed rent is tax exempt and a landlord can deduct interest payments associated 
with a mortgage when calculating taxable income.  Agents do not receive utility from 
government expenditure. Fourthly, there is a capital gains tax that can vary with 
income,  ()
ci Y τ . We use an indicator variable L
c to indicate whether the capital gains 
tax applies to all households (L
c = 1) or just landlords (L
c=0). Fifthly, there is a 
property tax (see below). Landlords can deduct their property tax against expenses. 
 
Flats and large houses cost 
F
t P  and 
H
t P  to purchase. There are also annual property 
charges 
h
t P γ which can be thought of as maintenance or property tax charges. The 
vector  {0,0, , }
h FH
t tt P PP
γ γγ = describes the charges paid by the occupiers of the four 
different housing tenures, for landlords are responsible for paying the charges on 
rented houses. When the flats are leased, the price 
R
t P  is paid in advance at the 
beginning of the lease. Landlords are assumed to be agent in period 2 of their lives. 37 
The number of landlords is endogenous; an indicator variable 
,,* ijR
t I  indicates the 





Because there is no uncertainty, the after-tax return from purchasing a flat in period 
t, leasing it, and selling it in period t+1 is equal to the after-tax return from lending 
money. As such, the relationship between rent, tax rates, flat prices, and interest rates 
is  
2 211 2 ( )(1 )(1 (1 )) ( ) (1 (1 ))
R F T F cF F F T
t t t t tt t t P P r P PP P r γτ τ τ τ ++ − − +− +− − = +−(4) 
or  
   
22
22
(1 (1 )(1 (1 )) (1 (1 ))








γτ τ π τ
ττ
 + − + − −+ −
=  − +− 
  (5) 
where 
F
t π  is the rate of price appreciation for flats. The right hand side of equation 4 
is the after-tax return in period t+1 from investing
F
t P in interest earning bonds. The 
left hand side is the after-tax return at t+1 from using the same sum to purchase a 
rental flat at time t. It comprises the after-tax rent paid at time t and reinvested at 
interest (with an adjustment for property maintenance charges), plus the proceeds 
from selling the rental unit at time t+1, adjusted for capital gains tax. Since interest 
payments by landlords are fully tax deductible, the return to a landlord is 
independent of their level of gearing. It is assumed that the landlords are high 
income agents in period 2 of their lives, so after-tax returns are calculated using the 
top marginal tax rate τ2. 
 
                                                            
8 If there is demand for 2f flats, the f highest income individuals are assumed to own 2 flats each.  38 
There are separate supply functions for the two types of houses, and the quantity of 
each is determined in equilibrium along with rents and prices. Linear supply 
functions are specified: 
  ( ) 01
01
F F FF H
t tt








                     (6) 
In this specification the price of flats is an increasing function of the total number of 
properties (to reflect the possible scarcity of land), while the price of houses is 
determined as a variable premium over the price of flats (to reflect the additional 
building costs). In most of the simulations presented below, parameters are chosen 
so that a 1 percent increase in the number of properties leads to about a 1 percent 
increase in the price of flats.  
 
A1.3: The lending market 
There is a non-profit financial intermediary that accepts deposits and issues 
mortgages at an interest rate  t r . Agents can lend or borrow as much as the bank 
allows them at the one period interest rate  t r , subject only to the restriction that they 
have a zero debt position at the end of their life. The economy is open and real 
interest rates are determined exogenously. There are no restrictions on the deposit 
contract, and interest on a deposit made at time t is paid at time t+1. Agents pay tax 
on this interest at their marginal tax rate, but do not get a tax deduction for interest 




 An agent’s 
positive funds are labelled  .  
 
                                                            
9 To reduce computational complexity, the marginal tax rate is calculated on the basis of labour 
income, not total income. Otherwise the marginal tax rate is determined endogenously.  39 
The mortgage contract is subject to three restrictions.
10
i) The loan to value restriction.  
  
The mortgage may not exceed a certain fraction of the value of the property. In 
particular, the gross amount borrowed 
, ij
t D
− cannot exceed the value of property 
multiplied by the loan to value ratio θ: that is  














− >  if the agent borrows.) This restriction means that agents who rent 
cannot borrow to smooth consumption, although they can save.  
 
ii) The regular cash payment restriction  
Banks only issue η-year table mortgages, and require a “cash payment” in the period 
the mortgage is issued. This restriction is imposed to mimic a standard condition of a 
table mortgage, namely that a customer is required to make regular cash repayments 
CP of equal size throughout the life of the mortgage rather than a large repayment at 
its terminal date. The payment size CP is chosen to ensure the mortgage is retired at 
the end of the term: if D









=  +− 
            (8) 
η is assumed to be 25 years. 
 
It is not possible to exactly replicate this feature of a standard mortgage contract in 
the model. However, a close approximation is achieved by requiring the customer to 
make a payment that pays off some of the interest and principal in any period he or 
                                                            
10 Note that banks impose these restrictions even though there is no uncertainty in the model 40 
she has debt. In particular, a customer with gross debt of 
, ij
t D
−  is required to open 
up a separate account with the bank and make a deposit of size  


















+ +−  
  (9) 
into this account. This deposit earns (untaxed) interest at rate rt. This means the net 
borrowing position of a borrowing agent, 
, , ,* ij ij ij
tt t DD D
− = − , is less than the gross 
borrowing position. Without this “cash payment” feature, many agents would prefer 
to purchase rather than rent simply because the interest payment occurs a period 
later than the rental payment. When the “cash payment” requirement is imposed, 
purchasing a house requires a larger payment to the bank in period t than the cost of 
renting a house.  
 
iii) The mortgage-repayment-to-income restriction  
The maximum amount an agent can borrow is restricted to ensure the mortgage 
repayment given by equation 8 is smaller than a fraction δ of income:  


















+ +−  
    (10) 
Note that this constraint is expressed in terms of nominal interest rates. 
  
The mortgage conditions are only imposed on agents in periods 0 and 1 of their lives 
in order to simplify the solution algorithm. In period 2 agents can borrow 
unrestricted amounts. The absence of a restriction in period 2 has little effect because 
agents are in their peak earning years, receive their inheritance at this time, and are 
actively saving or reducing debt to finance their retirement.  
 41 
A1.4 Utility maximisation 
An agent born at time t solves the following constrained maximisation problem (the 
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Lines 2 and 3 of equation (11) are the budget constraints facing the agent in the four 
periods. Lending and borrowing are entered separately as there are different after-tax 
interest rates, and there are terms to reflect maintenance charges, capital gains tax, 
inheritance and rental income. Lending and borrowing in period 3 are restricted to 
equal zero, and 
i τ is the marginal tax rate applying in period i of the agent’s life. The 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions in lines 4 and 5 reflect the loan-to-value ratio constraints 
and the mortgage-repayment-to-income ratio constraints respectively. The Kuhn-
Tucker conditions in line 6 reflect the requirement that non-negative amount are lent 
and borrowed. The agent solves the problem by calculating the maximum utility for 42 
each housing pattern in the set , and then selecting the housing pattern with the 
highest utility. The use of log-linear utility functions means it is relatively 
straightforward to calculate an analytical solution for the optimal consumption path 
given a particular housing pattern, even  though each solution has 48 parts 
corresponding to the 48 possible combinations of Kuhn-Tucker conditions.  
 
A1.5 Equilibrium conditions 
In the simulations, the steady state equilibrium is found for an open economy in 
which agents borrow or lend at the world interest rate. In the steady state, the 
following price relationships hold: 
    (1 ) / (1 ) 1 tt rr π + += +  (12a) 









+ = +   (12b) 







ρ =   (12c) 
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22
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γτ τ π τ
ρ
ττ
 + − + − −+ −
==  − +− 
  (12d) 
Equation (12a) states that real interest rates are constant. The rate r is the foreign real 
interest rate. Equation (12b) states that flat prices appreciate at a constant rate. 
Equation (12c) states that the ratio of house prices to flat prices is constant. Equation 
(12d) is a restatement of equation 5, linking rents to interest rates and the flat price 
appreciation rate.  
  
For a set of parameters {
0*
1 ,, , , ,,, , , ,,,,, ,
g




cc L τττ and housing parameters { } 0101 ,,,
FFHH αααα the steady state equilibrium 43 
is described by a set of prices { } ,,,
FHR r πρρ, a GST rate





tis tis s c −+ −+ = I  for each agent j in each cohort born in 
period t-i, and a net foreign asset position Bt
net such that all agents have maximal 
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= ∑∑   (13e) 
 
where  and
FH QQ are the number of houses produced when the supply of properties 












= =− . 
Equation (13a) requires that total consumption plus house maintenance plus tax plus 
real earnings on the net bond position in each period equals total production. 
Equation (13b) is the net supply of foreign bonds, given that landlords are assumed 44 
to borrow 100 percent of the price of a flat. This will change through time if there is 
inflation. Equation 13c says that the total tax take is equal to labour income tax plus 
GST revenue plus tax on interest plus tax on rent adjusted for the interest rate tax 
deduction for landlords and the capital gains tax they pay, plus the capital gains tax 
paid by home-owners. Note that while it has been assumed landlords borrow 100 
percent of the value of the property, tax revenue would not change if landlords had 
different gearing as the tax rate on positive balances is the same as the tax deduction 
they get when they borrow. Equations (13d) and (13e) require that the total demand 
for flats equals the supply of flats, and that the total demand for houses equals the 
supply of houses. 
 
A1.6 Parameterisation 
The set of baseline parameters {




g cc L τ ττττ and housing parameters { } 0101 ,,,
FFHH αααα  have been chosen 
to approximate features of the New Zealand economy. These are listed in table 4. 
Except for income distribution, the income parameters approximately match the 
basic lifecycle and cohort income patterns of New Zealanders reported in census 
documents, 1966-2001, under the assumption that the basic agent is a household 
comprised of a male and female of the same age. For simplicity, annual income is 
assumed to be uniformly distributed over the range $25000 to $80000.  
 
In the baseline model, the discount rate is 3 percent, the real interest rate is 5 percent 
(assumed equal to the world rate), and banks impose borrowing restrictions that limit 
households to borrow up to 90 percent of the value of a property and to pay no 
more than 30 percent of their income in debt servicing. The banking sector 45 
parameters are changed in some of the simulations, but these reflect the conditions 
facing New Zealand borrowers since the year 2000.  
 
The tax rates also reflect New Zealand tax settings in 2000. In the baseline model, 
the marginal tax is 20 percent for households with incomes less than $50000, and 33 
percent for households with incomes above that level. The model is also solved for a 
set of tax rules that exclude the inflation component of interest income from tax, and 




  The GST rate was chosen to ensure that capital income taxes and 




R RFH υ υυυ =  (0.18,0.32,0.35,0.54) mean (approximately) 
that at the margin a household would be prepared to spend 18 percent of their 
income on shared accommodation rather than have no accommodation, and 32 
percent of their income to rent a whole flat; the additional benefit from living in an 
owner-occupied flat rather than a rented flat is 3% of income, and the additional 
benefit from living in a large house a further 20 percent. These parameters are quite 
arbitrary, but have been varied by the author to ensure the results are not completely 
sensitive to these choices. The housing supply parameters were chosen so that that 
the elasticity of flats with respect to prices was 1 percent in the elastic case. The 
model was solved for inflation rates ranging from 0 to 3 percent, reflecting the legal 
requirement that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand achieve stability in the general 
level of prices. 
                                                            




A1.7 Solution technique 




ttt t PPP τ
=−  so that when each agent j born in period t-i, i= 0,…3  is 




tis tis s c −+ −+ = I that solves 
their constrained utility problem given by equation (11), the aggregation conditions 




ttt t PPP τ
=−  can be calculated from the vector 
*
0 {, , , }
gFFH PP τ πρ =  
and the parameters { } 2 , r τ .  
The basic structure of the algorithm is as follows.  
a)  Let the vector 
*,
0 {, , , }
k g F F Hk PP τ πρ =  be the k
th estimate of the steady state 
solution 
* P . Given 
*,k P , calculate the optimal consumption and housing 
tenure paths for each of the N households who are born at t=0 by searching 
over the different possible tenure paths in the set .  
b)  Use these results to calculate the demand for consumption goods and 
housing at time t=0 for all households in the economy.  
c)  Use these results to calculate aggregate consumption, the aggregate demand 
for flats, and the aggregate demand for houses at time t=0. Then calculate the 
excess demand functions given by 13a – 13e.  
d)  If the excess demand functions are not sufficiently close to zero, a new 
estimate of the equilibrium prices
* P ,
*, 1 k P
+ , is calculated. This is done using a 
discrete approximation to the Newton-Rhapson method. A set of quasi-
derivatives is calculated by recalculating the set of excess demand functions at 
the prices  1 { ,,,}
g FFH P τ πρ +∆ ,  2 {, , , }
gF FH P τ πρ +∆ , 47 
3 {, , , }
gFF H P τπ ρ +∆  and {, , ,
gFFH P τ πρ +  4} ∆ . These quasi derivatives 
are used to calculate the updated price vector using Broyden’s method. The 
process is continued until the sequence of estimates 
*,k P converges.  
 
 
 Motu Working Paper Series 
All papers are available online at www.motu.org.nz or by contacting Motu Economic 
and Public Policy Research. 
 
09-11  Grimes, Arthur and Chris Young. 2009. "Spatial Effects of 'Mill' Closure: Does Distance 
Matter?" 
 
09-11  Maré, David C and Steven Stillman. 2009. "The Impact of Immigration on the Labour Market 
Outcomes of New Zealanders”.  
 
09-10  Stillman, Steven and David C Maré. 2009. "The Labour Market Adjustment of Immigrants in 
New Zealand”. 
 
09-09  Kerr, Suzi and Kelly Lock. 2009. “Nutrient Trading in Lake Rotorua: Cost Sharing and 
Allowance Allocation”. 
 
09-08  Coleman, Andrew and Grant M Scobie. 2009. “A Simple Model of Housing Rental and 
Ownership with Policy Simulations”. 
 
09-07  Crawford, Ron. 2009. “Variations in Earnings Growth: Evidence from Earnings Transitions in 
the NZ Linked Income Survey”.  
 
09-06  Maré, David C. 2009. “Agglomeration Elasticities in New Zealand”. 
 
09-05  Poot, Jacques. 2009. “Trans-Tasman Migration, Transnationalism and Economic 
Development in Australasia”. 
 
09-04  Hengyun, Ma; Les Oxley and John Gibson. 2009. “China’s Energy Situation and Its 
Implications in the New Millenium”. 
 
09-03  Hengyun, Ma; Les Oxley and John Gibson. 2009. “Testing for Energy Market Integration in 
China”. 
 
09-02  Hengyun, Ma; Les Oxley, John Gibson and Bongguen Kim. 2009. “China's Energy Economy: 
Technical Change, Factor Demand and Interfactor/Interfuel Substitution”. 
 
09-01  Cumming, Jackie; Steven Stillman and Michelle Poland. 2009. “Who Pays What for Primary 
Health Care? Patterns and Determinants of the Fees Paid by Patients in a Mixed Public-
Private Financing Model”. 
 
08-14  Coleman, Andrew. 2008. “Tax, Credit Constraints, and the Big Costs of Small Inflation”. 
 
08-13  Coleman, Andrew. 2008. “Storage Under Backwardation: A Direct Test of the Wright-
Williams Conjecture”. 
 
08-12  Maré, David C. 2008. “Labour Productivity in Auckland Firms”.  
 
08-11  Stillman, Steven; Malathi Velamuri and Andrew Aitken. 2008. “The Long-Run Impact of 
New Zealand's Structural Reform on Local Communities”.  
 
08-10  Grimes, Arthur and Andrew Aitken. 2008. “Water, Water Somewhere: The Value of Water in 
a Drought-Prone Farming Region”. 
 
08-09  Coleman, Andrew. 2008. “Inflation and the Measurement of Saving and Housing 
Affordability”. 
 
08-08  Coleman, Andrew and Özer Karagedikli. 2008. “The Relative Size of New Zealand Exchange 
Rate and Interest Rate Responses to News”.  
08-07   Grimes, Arthur and Yun Liang. 2008. “Bridge to Somewhere: The Value of Auckland's 
Northern Motorway Extensions". 
 
08-06   Stillman, Steven and David C Maré. 2008. “Housing Markets and Migration: Evidence from 
New Zealand”.  
 
08-05   Lock, Kelly and Suzi Kerr. 2008. “Nutrient Trading in Lake Rotorua: Choosing the Scope of a 
Nutrient Trading System”.  
 
08-04   Kerr, Suzi and Andrew Sweet. 2008. “Inclusion of Agriculture and Forestry in a Domestic 
Emissions Trading Scheme: New Zealand’s Experience to Date”.  
 
08-03   Kerr, Suzi and Kit Rutherford. 2008. “Nutrient Trading in Lake Rotorua: Reporting and 
Modelling Net Nutrient Inputs”. 
 
08-02  Lock, Kelly and Suzi Kerr. 2008. “Nutrient Trading in Lake Rotorua: Overview of a Prototype 
System”. 
 
08-01  Stroombergen, Adolf. 2008. “ESSAM General Equilibrium Model: Estimation of 2005/06 
  Input-Output Tables”. 
 
07-13   Hall, Viv and John McDermott. 2007. "A quarterly post-World War II real GDP series for 
New Zealand". 
07-12  Gibson, John; Trinh Le and Steven Stillman. 2007. "What Explains the Wealth Gap Between 
Immigrants and the New Zealand Born?" 
07-11  Maré, David C.; Melanie Morten and Steven Stillman, 2007. “Settlement Patterns and the 
Geographic Mobility of Recent Migrants to New Zealand”. 
07-10  Grimes, Arthur; David C. Maré and Melanie Morten, 2007. “Adjustment in Local Labour and 
Housing Markets.” 
07-09  Grimes, Arthur and Yun Liang, “Spatial Determinants of Land Prices in Auckland: Does the 
Metropolitan Urban Limit Have an Effect?” 
07-08  Kerr, Suzi; Kit Rutherford and Kelly Lock, “Nutrient Trading in Lake Rotorua: Goals and 
Trading Caps”. 
07-07  Hendy, Joanna; Suzi Kerr and Troy Baisden, “The Land Use in Rural New Zealand Model 
Version 1 (LURNZ v1): Model Description”. 
07-06  Lock, Kelly and Suzi Kerr, “Nutrient Trading in Lake Rotorua: Where Are We Now?” 
07-05  Stillman, Steven and David C Maré, “The Impact of Immigration on the Geographic Mobility 
of New Zealanders”. 
07-04  Grimes, Arthur and Yun Liang, “An Auckland Land Value Annual Database”. 
07-03  Kerr, Suzi; Glen Lauder and David Fairman, “Towards Design for a Nutrient Trading 
Programme to Improve Water Quality in Lake Rotorua”. 
07-02  Lock, Kelly and Stefan Leslie, “New Zealand’s Quota Management System: A History of the 
First 20 Years”. 
07-01  Grimes, Arthur and Andrew Aitken. 2007. “House Prices and Rents: Socio-Economic Impacts 
and Prospects”. 
06-09  Maani, Sholeh A.; Rhema Vaithianathan and Barbara Wolf. 2006. “Inequality and Health: Is 
House Crowding the Link?” 
06-08  Maré, David C and Jason Timmins. 2006. “Geographic Concentration and Firm Productivity”. 
06-07  Grimes, Arthur; David C Maré and Melanie Morten. 2006. “Defining Areas Linking 
Geographic Data in New Zealand”. 
06-06  Maré, David C and Yun Liang. 2006. “Labour Market Outcomes for Young Graduates”. 06-05  Hendy, Joanna and Suzi Kerr. 2006. “Land-Use Intensity Module: Land Use in Rural 
New Zealand Version 1”. 
06-04  Hendy, Joanna; Suzi Kerr and Troy Baisden. 2006. “Greenhouse Gas Emissions Charges and 
Credits on Agricultural Land: What Can a Model Tell Us?” 
06-03  Hall, Viv B; John McDermott and James Tremewan. 2006. “The Ups and Downs of 
New Zealand House Prices”. 
06-02  McKenzie, David; John Gibson and Steven Stillman. 2006. “How Important is Selection? 
Experimental vs Non-Experimental Measures of the Income Gains from Migration”. 
06-01  Grimes, Arthur and Andrew Aitken. 2006. “Housing Supply and Price Adjustment”. 
05-14  Timmins, Jason. 2005. “Is Infrastructure Productive? Evaluating the Effects of Specific 
Infrastructure Projects on Firm Productivity within New Zealand”. 
05-13  Coleman, Andrew; Sylvia Dixon and David C Maré, “Māori Economic Development—
Glimpses from Statistical Sources”. 
05-12  Maré, David C 2005. “Concentration, Specialisation and Agglomeration of Firms in 
New Zealand”. 
05-11  Holmes, Mark J and Arthur Grimes. 2005. “Is There Long-Run Convergence of Regional 
House Prices in the UK?” 
05-10  Hendy, Joanna and Suzi Kerr. 2005. “Greenhouse Gas Emission Factor Module: Land Use in 
Rural New Zealand—Climate Version 1”. 
05-09  Poland, Michelle and David C Maré. 2005. “Defining Geographic Communities”. 
05-08  Kerr, Suzi; Joanna Hendy, Emma Brunton and Isabelle Sin. 2005. “The Likely Regional 
Impacts of an Agricultural Emissions Policy in New Zealand: Preliminary Analysis”. 
05-07  Stillman, Steven. 2005. “Examining Changes in the Value of Rural Land in New Zealand 
between 1989 and 2003”. 
05-06  Dixon, Sylvia and David C Maré. 2005. “Changes in the Māori Income Distribution: Evidence 
from the Population Census”. 
05-05  Sin, Isabelle and Steven Stillman. 2005. “The Geographical Mobility of Māori in 
New Zealand”. 
05-04  Grimes, Arthur. 2005. “Regional and Industry Cycles in Australasia: Implications for a 
Common Currency”. 
05-03  Grimes, Arthur. 2005. “Intra and Inter-Regional Industry Shocks: A New Metric with an 
Application to Australasian Currency Union”. 
05-02  Grimes, Arthur; Robert Sourell and Andrew Aitken. 2005. “Regional Variation in Rental 
Costs for Larger Households”. 
05-01  Maré, David C. 2005. “Indirect Effects of Active Labour Market Policies”. 
04-12  Dixon, Sylvia and David C Maré. 2004. “Understanding Changes in Māori Incomes and 
Income Inequality 1997–2003”. 
04-11  Grimes, Arthur. 2004. “New Zealand: A Typical Australasian Economy?” 
04-10  Hall, Viv and John McDermott. 2004. “Regional Business Cycles in New Zealand: Do They 
Exist? What Might Drive Them?” 
04-09  Grimes, Arthur; Suzi Kerr and Andrew Aitken. 2004. “Bi-Directional Impacts of Economic, 
Social and Environmental Changes and the New Zealand Housing Market”. 
04-08  Grimes, Arthur and Andrew Aitken. 2004. “What’s the Beef with House Prices? Economic 
Shocks and Local Housing Markets”. 
04-07  McMillan, John. 2004. “Quantifying Creative Destruction: Entrepreneurship and Productivity 
in New Zealand”. 04-06  Maré, David C and Isabelle Sin. 2004. “Māori Incomes: Investigating Differences Between 
Iwi”. 
04-05  Kerr, Suzi; Emma Brunton and Ralph Chapman. 2004. “Policy to Encourage Carbon 
Sequestration in Plantation Forests”. 
04-04  Maré, David C. 2004. “What do Endogenous Growth Models Contribute?” 
04-03  Kerr, Suzi; Joanna Hendy, Shuguang Liu and Alexander S. P. Pfaff. 2004. “Uncertainty and 
Carbon Policy Integrity”. 
04-02  Grimes, Arthur; Andrew Aitken and Suzi Kerr. 2004. “House Price Efficiency: Expectations, 
Sales, Symmetry”. 
04-01  Kerr, Suzi; Andrew Aitken and Arthur Grimes. 2004. “Land Taxes and Revenue Needs as 
Communities Grow and Decline: Evidence from New Zealand”. 
03-19  Maré, David C. 2003. “Ideas for Growth?” 
03-18  Fabling, Richard and Arthur Grimes. 2003. “Insolvency and Economic Development: 
Regional Variation and Adjustment”. 
03-17  Kerr, Suzi; Susana Cardenas and Joanna Hendy.  2003. “Migration and the Environment in the 
Galapagos: An Analysis of Economic and Policy Incentives Driving Migration, Potential 
Impacts from Migration Control, and Potential Policies to Reduce Migration Pressure”. 
03-16  Hyslop, Dean R and David C Maré. 2003. “Understanding New Zealand’s Changing Income 
Distribution 1983–98: A Semiparametric Analysis”. 
03-15  Kerr, Suzi. 2003. “Indigenous Forests and Forest Sink Policy in New Zealand”. 
03-14  Hall, Viv and Angela Huang. 2003. “Would Adopting the US Dollar Have Led to Improved 
Inflation, Output and Trade Balances for New Zealand in the 1990s?” 
03-13  Ballantyne, Suzie; Simon Chapple, David C Maré and Jason Timmins. 2003. “Movement into 
and out of Child Poverty in New Zealand: Results from the Linked Income Supplement”. 
03-12  Kerr, Suzi. 2003. “Efficient Contracts for Carbon Credits from Reforestation Projects”. 
03-11  Lattimore, Ralph. 2003. “Long Run Trends in New Zealand Industry Assistance”. 
03-10  Grimes, Arthur. 2003. “Economic Growth and the Size & Structure of Government: 
Implications for New Zealand”. 
03-09  Grimes, Arthur; Suzi Kerr and Andrew Aitken. 2003. “Housing and Economic Adjustment”. 
03-07  Maré, David C and Jason Timmins, “Moving to Jobs”. 
03-06  Kerr, Suzi; Shuguang Liu, Alexander S. P. Pfaff and R. Flint Hughes. 2003. “Carbon 
Dynamics and Land-Use Choices: Building a Regional-Scale Multidisciplinary Model”. 
03-05  Kerr, Suzi. 2003. “Motu, Excellence in Economic Research and the Challenges of ‘Human 
Dimensions’ Research”. 
03-04  Kerr, Suzi and Catherine Leining. 2003. “Joint Implementation in Climate Change Policy”. 
03-03  Gibson, John. 2003. “Do Lower Expected Wage Benefits Explain Ethnic Gaps in Job-Related 
Training? Evidence from New Zealand”. 
03-02  Kerr, Suzi; Richard G Newell and James N Sanchirico. 2003. “Evaluating the New Zealand 
Individual Transferable Quota Market for Fisheries Management”. 
03-01  Kerr, Suzi. 2003. “Allocating Risks in a Domestic Greenhouse Gas Trading System”. 
 
 
 